India’s plan to raise nuclear power capacity from about 8.78 GW today to 100 GW by 2047 is creating an infrastructure challenge that begins before a reactor is built: securing enough uranium to keep the future fleet operating. The country is pursuing long-term supply arrangements with Uzbekistan, Australia and Canada, while state-owned power companies explore direct stakes in overseas uranium assets. At the same time, domestic policy is opening civil nuclear power generation to private companies, potentially increasing demand for fuel and placing greater importance on the reliability of the entire supply chain.
The immediate issue is scale. India currently operates 24 nuclear reactors with a combined capacity of about 8.78 GW. The government has set an intermediate target of approximately 22 GW by 2031-32 and a long-term target of 100 GW by 2047 under the Nuclear Energy Mission announced in the Union Budget for 2025-26. Industry estimates cited in the source material suggest that a 100-GW nuclear fleet could require 18,000-20,000 tonnes of natural uranium each year. That would amount to roughly a third of current global uranium mine production.
Those figures explain why uranium procurement is becoming a strategic infrastructure concern rather than a routine commercial transaction. A power plant can be planned, financed and constructed over several years, but its generation depends on a continuing supply of nuclear fuel that meets regulatory and safeguards requirements. A shortfall in fuel availability could affect the utilisation of completed reactors, even if the physical generation capacity has been added.
India has uranium reserves in Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh and Meghalaya, but domestic availability has historically constrained the civil nuclear programme. For years, the country addressed the gap through government-to-government supply agreements. The scale of the proposed expansion now requires a wider procurement strategy, involving multiple countries, longer-term contracts and possible ownership exposure to mining assets.
The latest element of that strategy is Uzbekistan. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tashkent last month, India and Uzbekistan agreed to work towards a long-term framework for uranium supplies. The discussions followed a 2019 contract under which Uzbekistan’s state-owned Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Company agreed to supply 1,100 metric tonnes of natural uranium concentrate to India through 2026. Parliamentary records cited in the source material show that India had received approximately 600 metric tonnes of that contracted quantity by March 2025.
The proposed long-term framework with Uzbekistan has not yet been formally signed. Siby George, secretary (west) in the Ministry of External Affairs, was quoted by PTI as saying that positive discussions had taken place and that the two sides were moving towards an agreement. No uranium-specific agreement was included among the 11 agreements formally signed during Modi’s visit. The distinction matters because the current development signals negotiation and strategic intent, not a completed new supply contract.
Australia offers another route for diversification. In July, India and Australia finalised an Administrative Arrangement under their 2014 Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The arrangement provides a framework for long-term Australian uranium exports to India under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Australia has more than a third of the world’s known uranium resources, according to the supplied material, making the arrangement significant for a country seeking access to a broader set of suppliers.
Canada has moved further towards a defined commercial commitment. In March, Cameco Corporation and India’s Department of Atomic Energy signed a nine-year agreement valued at about $2.6 billion for nearly 22 million pounds of uranium ore concentrate between 2027 and 2035. The agreement was signed during Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to India, and both governments described it as part of a renewed strategic energy partnership.
The Canadian arrangement gives India visibility over supplies for several years, but it does not by itself resolve the requirements of a 100-GW fleet. The agreements with Canada, Australia and Uzbekistan should instead be understood as components of a portfolio approach. India is seeking to reduce dependence on any single source while combining government-backed arrangements with commercial contracts and possible direct investment in mining.
That last component could change the way India approaches fuel security. NTPC, the country’s largest power producer, has been tasked with developing roughly 30 GW of the planned 100-GW nuclear capacity. It has issued a tender to appoint consultants to identify uranium mining assets in which it could invest. The countries under consideration include Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan and South Africa.
An equity stake in overseas mines would give Indian state-owned companies a different form of exposure to the fuel chain. Long-term purchase contracts provide an assured commercial supply arrangement for a specified period. Direct investment could create a closer connection to production assets, although the supplied material does not establish the terms, scale or final outcome of any proposed investments. At this stage, the tender indicates that India is examining ownership as a complement to procurement.
The fuel question is becoming more urgent because India’s domestic nuclear policy is also changing. In December 2025, Parliament passed the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India, or SHANTI, Act. The legislation ended the six-decade-old state monopoly over civil nuclear power generation and allows private companies to build, own and operate nuclear power plants for the first time.
The reform does not transfer the entire nuclear fuel cycle to private industry. The government retains control over sensitive areas including uranium enrichment, heavy-water production and long-term spent-fuel management. This creates a mixed institutional structure: private companies may participate in generation, while the state continues to control critical parts of the fuel and waste-management system.
Interest from major industrial groups suggests that nuclear generation is being considered not only as a national grid resource but also as a source of dependable electricity for energy-intensive sectors. Reliance Industries, Adani Power, Tata Power, Hindalco Industries, Jindal Steel and Power and JSW Energy have shown interest in a tender floated by the state-run Nuclear Power Corporation of India for co-developing 220 MWe Bharat Small Reactors. The source material links that interest to potential demand from sectors such as steel, cement and data centres.
Tata Power has set 2032-33 as a target for commissioning what would be India’s first privately built nuclear plant. The company has been scouting sites in Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and Gujarat, with construction potentially beginning as early as 2028. These plans remain milestones and intentions rather than operating capacity. Their significance lies in the way they connect the domestic generation pipeline with the international fuel strategy: more reactor developers and more planned capacity mean a larger requirement for predictable fuel access.
India is also pursuing a longer-term alternative through its three-stage nuclear programme and its thorium resources. The programme envisages a transition from uranium-fuelled reactors to fast breeder reactors and eventually to reactors using uranium-233 produced from thorium. The Department of Atomic Energy describes thorium-232 as a material that can be converted into fissile uranium-233 for the third stage.
A significant milestone came when the 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam in Tamil Nadu achieved first criticality. The Department of Atomic Energy has described the PFBR as the flagship of the second stage of the three-stage programme. In that stage, thorium-232 can be converted through transmutation into uranium-233, which could provide fuel for the third stage.
The PFBR does not immediately remove the need for conventional uranium supplies. India’s planned capacity increase over the coming decades will still depend on reactors requiring dependable access to uranium. The thorium programme therefore operates on a different timescale from the current procurement drive. It represents a possible route towards greater fuel-cycle self-reliance, while the immediate expansion strategy requires India to secure external supplies and strengthen domestic arrangements.
This creates two parallel tracks in India’s nuclear infrastructure policy. The first is a near- and medium-term effort to expand generation by building reactors and arranging sufficient uranium through international contracts, domestic production and possibly overseas mining investments. The second is a longer-term technology programme intended to make greater use of thorium and uranium-233. The second track may eventually alter India’s fuel requirements, but the supplied evidence does not establish when that transition will materially reduce the need for conventional uranium.
The broader urban and industrial implication is that nuclear expansion is not simply a question of adding generating capacity to the national grid. It requires coordination between international diplomacy, mining assets, safeguards, fuel processing, public-sector institutions, private developers and long-term waste management. The SHANTI Act may widen the pool of companies willing to build plants, but the state remains central to the parts of the nuclear system that determine fuel security and strategic control.
India’s 100-GW ambition therefore depends on more than reactor construction. The country must convert preliminary frameworks into reliable contracts, ensure that supplies arrive as planned, and determine whether overseas mining investments can complement purchased fuel. The available evidence confirms a deliberate diversification strategy involving Uzbekistan, Australia and Canada, alongside domestic reform and the thorium programme. What remains unresolved is whether this expanding network can deliver fuel at the scale and pace required by the planned reactor fleet.
