The Chhattisgarh High Court’s refusal to return unused land acquired for the Hasdeo Bango Canal Project has reinforced a significant principle in public infrastructure administration: land acquired for a public project does not automatically become restorable to former owners merely because no visible structure stands on every portion of it.
In a common order delivered by Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad on November 5, the court dismissed two connected petitions filed by members of a family from Brahmanpali village in Raigarh district. The petitioners sought the return of portions of agricultural land acquired in 2004 for the Hasdeo Bango, also known as the Minimata Bango, Canal Project. The land parcels measured 0.598 hectare and 0.356 hectare.
The ruling turns on the difference between physical occupation and continuing public use. The petitioners argued that the canal had been completed more than a decade earlier and that demarcation and enquiry reports showed substantial portions of their land had not been affected. They relied on Section 101 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, which provides for the return of land that remains unutilised for five years.
The court rejected that interpretation because the acquisition had taken place under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. An award was issued on February 28, 2004, and the petitioners did not challenge either the acquisition or the award itself. The court held that Section 101 applied to acquisitions under the 2013 law and could not be extended to acquisitions completed under the earlier legislation.
The distinction is important because the two laws treat the legal consequences of acquisition differently. According to the government’s submissions recorded in the case, land acquired under the 1894 Act vested absolutely in the State, and that law did not contain a provision equivalent to Section 101. The State therefore argued that the former owners had no statutory right to seek restoration merely because some acquired portions were not visibly occupied by the canal.
The court accepted the broader infrastructure argument as well. Government counsel said the canal had been providing irrigation since 2005-06 and that land along both banks remained necessary for inspection, maintenance and supervision. Following directions issued by the court on June 15, 2026, the executive engineer and the Collector filed affidavits stating that open spaces on both banks were required for inspection pathways and maintenance. Other portions were earmarked for possible hutments, storerooms and site offices.
This reasoning addresses a recurring administrative difficulty in linear infrastructure projects. A canal, road, railway or utility corridor is not limited to the area occupied by its central physical structure. Operation and maintenance may require access routes, safety margins, storage, staff facilities and working space. The court specifically noted that a canal project could require more land than the channel itself and that the absence of a structure on a particular parcel did not by itself establish that the land was surplus.
The case therefore separates three questions that are often treated as one. The first is whether the original acquisition was legally completed. The second is whether the land is physically occupied by the main infrastructure. The third is whether the State continues to require the land for the original or an allied public purpose. In this matter, the court found that the acquisition had vested the land in the State and that the authorities had provided an explanation for retaining the disputed portions.
That distinction also limits the reach of post-acquisition restitution claims. Section 101 of the 2013 Act was designed to address land that remains unutilised for five years, but the court held that the provision could not be used retrospectively to reopen acquisitions under the 1894 Act. The judgment consequently prevents the five-year rule from operating as a general return mechanism across all historical acquisitions.
The High Court’s approach also reflects the limits of judicial review in land administration. The court said that its role was to examine whether the Collector’s decision was mala fide, arbitrary or a colourable exercise of power. It did not treat the existence of unused or open land as sufficient evidence of an unlawful decision. Since the petitioners had not challenged the original acquisition or the 2004 award, the later challenge had to overcome the State’s claim that the land remained connected to the canal’s public purpose.
The Collector had rejected the landowners’ applications on September 27, 2021. The petitioners then approached the High Court, seeking either restoration of the land or reconsideration through a reasoned order. The court found no enforceable statutory right supporting either request and dismissed both petitions without costs.
For infrastructure agencies, the ruling underscores the importance of documenting the full operational footprint of a project. A physical channel or structure may be only one part of the land requirement. Inspection corridors, maintenance areas and future support facilities must be identified and explained if authorities are required to defend continued possession. In this case, the affidavits filed by the executive engineer and the Collector supplied that administrative explanation.
For landowners, the judgment illustrates the importance of the legal framework under which land was acquired. The petitioners’ reliance on the 2013 Act could not overcome the court’s finding that their land had been acquired under the 1894 Act. The date and statutory basis of acquisition were therefore decisive, alongside the fact that the original acquisition and award had not been challenged.
The ruling does not establish that every parcel acquired for infrastructure can be retained indefinitely without scrutiny. It confirms instead that non-use alone does not create an enforceable right to restoration where the land has vested in the State and remains required for the original or an allied public purpose. Judicial intervention would still be available where a retention decision is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or otherwise legally defective.
The larger administrative question is how governments should distinguish between land genuinely needed for long-term infrastructure operations and land that has become excess after a project changes. The judgment does not prescribe a new land audit or release process. It decides the petitions on the statutory framework applicable to the 2004 acquisition, the continuing irrigation function of the canal and the explanations provided by the authorities.
The Hasdeo Bango case thus confirms two boundaries in public land governance. The 2013 Act’s five-year unutilised-land provision cannot be applied to acquisitions under the 1894 Act, and the absence of a visible structure is not conclusive proof that land has lost its public purpose. The legal position will continue to turn on the acquisition statute, the status of vesting, the evidence of continuing need and whether the authority’s decision withstands judicial review.
