India is heading into the September 12-13 BRICS summit in New Delhi with a payments strategy that is less politically dramatic than a common currency but potentially more practical: connect national payment systems and explore interoperability between central bank digital currencies.
The distinction is important. A common BRICS currency would require the grouping to create a new monetary unit capable of operating across economies that use the rupee, yuan, rouble and other national currencies. India has repeatedly opposed that idea. Linking existing payment systems or digital versions of national currencies would allow countries to retain monetary sovereignty while making some cross-border transactions faster and less expensive.
The Economic Times reported on August 29, citing people familiar with the deliberations, that India was likely to propose seamless cross-border digital payments and greater adoption of central bank digital currencies, or CBDCs, among BRICS members. The report also said that the final list of issues for the leaders’ summit had not yet been settled.
That uncertainty matters because the proposal remains a discussion rather than an agreed BRICS programme. Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra said on August 11 that cross-border payments were an area of interest for BRICS and that several options were being considered, including CBDCs and links between fast-payment systems. “There is a lot of scope for reducing cost,” Malhotra said, according to Reuters. He added that the issue was still at the discussion stage.
India’s position on a common currency is clearer. Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal said on August 7, after a meeting of BRICS trade and industry ministers in Jaipur, that India did not support introducing a BRICS currency. “We do not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme; India opposes it,” Goyal said, according to PTI.
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had expressed a similar position in December 2024, when he said at an event in Doha that BRICS countries had no interest in weakening the US dollar, Reuters reported. Those comments came soon after US President Donald Trump warned that BRICS members would face tariffs if they created a common currency or backed another currency intended to replace the dollar.
Trump repeated that warning in January 2025, threatening 100% tariffs against BRICS members that pursued such an arrangement. India has nevertheless sought greater international use of the rupee, while maintaining that this effort is not intended to advance de-dollarisation. The proposed payments approach allows New Delhi to pursue more efficient trade settlement without formally endorsing a new bloc-wide currency.
The technical foundation for the discussion is India’s digital rupee, or e₹. The Reserve Bank launched its retail CBDC pilot in December 2022. A CBDC is sovereign money issued electronically by a central bank. It is different from a payment rail such as the Unified Payments Interface. When a person sends Rs 500 through UPI, the system transfers commercial bank money between accounts. In a CBDC transaction, the digital money itself is issued by the central bank.
Interoperability between CBDCs could, in principle, allow businesses and travellers to make payments across participating economies using digital forms of national currencies. The potential benefit is a reduction in intermediaries and transaction costs. But connecting these systems would require agreement on technology, governance, regulation and final settlement.
The RBI’s proposal was reported by Reuters in January 2026, when the central bank recommended that linking the CBDCs of BRICS countries be considered for the agenda of India’s BRICS presidency. The proposal envisaged connecting official digital currencies to support cross-border trade and tourism payments. At that stage, it was a recommendation to the Indian government, not an approved bloc-wide plan.
The proposal followed the declaration adopted at the 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, which called for greater interoperability between members’ payment systems. Yet technical compatibility may not be the only obstacle. Reuters reported that reluctance among countries to adopt technology platforms developed elsewhere could slow progress. A workable system would require consensus on both technology and regulation among countries with different institutions and financial markets.
The experience of India-Russia trade illustrates a separate problem: payment infrastructure cannot by itself resolve an imbalance in trade flows. After India’s imports from Russia increased following the Ukraine war, Russia accumulated substantial rupee balances because it was selling considerably more to India than it was buying. That left limited avenues for Russia to use the rupees it received.
The Reserve Bank subsequently allowed such balances to be invested in Indian securities. Bilateral foreign-exchange swaps between central banks were also among the mechanisms being examined, with weekly or monthly settlements discussed as one possible way to manage the imbalance. The issue shows that a digital payment connection can make transfers easier without answering what happens when money consistently moves in one direction.
Russia’s recent statements indicate that the debate is not necessarily framed in Moscow as a campaign to replace the dollar. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on September 8 that Russia did not seek de-dollarisation and was open to acceptable methods of payment, Reuters reported. He said 90% of transactions between Russia and BRICS countries were being conducted in national currencies and that the problem of Russian companies accumulating excess Indian rupees was gradually being resolved.
Those comments provide political space for a payments arrangement that improves the use of national currencies without requiring a common monetary authority. They also underline the difference between reducing payment friction and replacing the dominant currency in international trade. The first involves infrastructure and settlement mechanisms. The second would require much deeper monetary, financial and political coordination.
For India, the emerging strategy therefore combines three distinct objectives: linking fast-payment systems, exploring CBDC interoperability and expanding the use of national currencies in trade. These objectives overlap, but they are not interchangeable. A fast-payment connection could allow existing bank-account systems to communicate across borders. CBDC interoperability would involve central-bank-issued digital money. Local-currency settlement would address the currency used for trade, but not necessarily the technical route through which payments are made.
The summit could move the discussion from broad interest towards a more defined work programme, but the supplied reporting does not establish that BRICS leaders will approve a specific network, technology platform or implementation timetable. It also does not establish a final mechanism for managing persistent trade imbalances or determining how participating central banks would share regulatory responsibility.
That is the larger urban and institutional question embedded in the proposal: whether cross-border financial infrastructure can be made interoperable without creating a new currency or a new central authority. For citizens, tourists and businesses, the practical test would be whether payments become cheaper, quicker and easier. For governments and central banks, the more difficult test would be ensuring that convenience does not create unresolved problems around settlement, regulation, technology ownership and uneven trade.
India’s position ahead of the New Delhi summit is consequently pragmatic rather than revolutionary. New Delhi is resisting the creation of a BRICS currency while supporting efforts to make existing national payment systems work more closely together. The next indicators will be the issues formally placed before BRICS leaders, whether CBDC and fast-payment discussions receive an agreed institutional mandate, and whether members can address the trade imbalances that digital connectivity alone cannot solve.
