The US House of Representatives’ approval of legislation allowing tariffs of up to 100% on countries that buy Russian crude has placed India’s energy security strategy at the centre of a wider trade and sanctions dispute. The immediate question is not simply whether Washington will impose the maximum tariff. It is whether India can reduce its dependence on Russian oil without increasing exposure to supply disruptions, higher prices and pressure on its exports to the United States.
The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 was approved by the House by 262 votes to 159 and will now go to President Donald Trump for his signature. The legislation had earlier passed the US Senate with an 86-11 vote. According to the report, the bill initially proposed tariffs of up to 500% on major buyers of Russian crude before the ceiling was reduced to 100%.
The proposed power is significant because it turns a sanctions framework aimed at Russia’s energy and defence sectors into a potential trade instrument against countries such as India and China. The bill also targets Russia’s “shadow fleet” of tankers, which the United States says is used to circumvent existing sanctions, and expands sanctions relating to Iran. The actual impact on India, however, will depend on whether the US President uses the power, the rate imposed, the products covered and the timetable for implementation.
That distinction matters for India because Russian crude is no longer a marginal component of its import basket. The report says Russia accounted for more than 30% of India’s crude oil supplies by the end of 2025. Data attributed to the Global Trade Research Initiative puts Russia’s share at 30.3% of India’s crude imports in FY2026, with supplies valued at $40.8 billion out of total crude imports worth $134.7 billion.
The dependence became even more pronounced in July 2026. Russian supplies accounted for more than half of India’s imported oil during the month, according to the report. The United Arab Emirates supplied 10.8%, Saudi Arabia 9.6%, Venezuela 6.3%, Brazil 5.5%, Oman 5.3% and the United States 2.9%. Russia’s July supply was therefore larger than the combined contribution of those six countries.
These figures show why the issue cannot be treated as a straightforward diplomatic choice between Washington and Moscow. India’s refiners have used Russian crude as a major source of supply since the Russia-Ukraine war disrupted established European purchases and made Russian oil available at deep discounts. The arrangement has altered the geography of India’s crude procurement while giving refiners access to a supplier that has become central to the country’s import strategy.
The report says India’s crude procurement is diversified across more than 40 countries. Diversification, however, does not mean that every supplier can immediately replace Russia at the same scale. Russia and Middle Eastern countries remain the main pillars of India’s oil security, while the availability of alternative supplies has been affected by conflict and transport disruptions in the Middle East.
The supplied report refers to the Strait of Hormuz as blocked and says attacks by the Houthis on a key Saudi pipeline have also affected alternative supplies. In that setting, Russian crude has become more than a discounted commercial option. It has also functioned as a hedge against disruptions affecting other major supply routes and producers.
This is the central institutional problem created by the proposed US tariff power. A tariff would not directly remove Russian crude from the global market. Instead, it would increase the cost of access to the US market for countries that continue buying it. For India, the pressure would operate through two linked channels: the price and availability of crude, and the competitiveness of Indian exports to the United States.
Ajay Srivastava, founder of the Global Trade Research Initiative, described the bill as an attempt to pressure India into accepting one-sided terms in a bilateral trade agreement. He argued that India buys Russian oil to secure affordable energy for its population and that these purchases have helped stabilise global supplies and prices. He also said the consequences of any new tariff could only be assessed after the US announces the tariff rate, product coverage and implementation timetable.
That qualification is important. The headline figure of 100% describes the maximum authority provided by the legislation, not a confirmed tariff on Indian exports. The bill gives the President discretion over whether to impose tariffs and at what level. The difference between legislative authority and executive action will determine whether the measure becomes a negotiating threat, a targeted trade penalty or a broad disruption to India-US commerce.
India has already experienced changing levels of US tariff pressure, according to the report. Indian exports faced 50% US tariffs for several months in the previous year before the rate was reduced to 18% earlier this year. The rate is now stated to be 10% following a US Supreme Court decision striking down reciprocal tariffs. The report does not establish how a new Russia-related tariff would interact with those measures, leaving the final structure of any action uncertain.
The trade exposure is nevertheless substantial. The report notes that the United States remains an important trading partner for India even though the country’s export basket has diversified and free trade agreements have opened other markets. A tariff increase could therefore affect Indian exporters even if it did not immediately change the crude procurement decisions of Indian refiners.
The previous response of Indian refiners offers one indication of how tariffs may work. India continued buying Russian crude after the US imposed penal tariffs last year, but purchases fell in the first two months of 2026 after the Trump administration sanctioned Lukoil and Rosneft, two major Russian oil companies. The report presents this contrast as evidence that sanctions affecting companies, shipping, insurance or payments can be more powerful than tariffs alone because they can make transactions commercially unviable.
The distinction is particularly relevant to urban and industrial India. Crude imports feed transport, manufacturing, aviation, construction activity and household energy costs through the wider fuel and refining system. A tariff on exports may be felt by companies trading with the United States, while restrictions that disrupt crude procurement could spread through logistics and production costs. The supplied evidence does not quantify those effects, but it establishes why crude access and trade access cannot be considered separate questions.
The Middle East conflict has made the timing more difficult. The report says Russian purchases dipped when sanctions and tariff pressure increased, but India later stepped up purchases after the US-Iran war disrupted global oil markets. The United States also waived sanctions on Russian crude to stabilise global oil prices, although the waiver later lapsed. Russian crude purchases then reached an all-time high in July, according to the report.
This sequence shows that India’s energy decisions are being shaped by immediate supply conditions as much as by diplomatic pressure. When alternative routes and suppliers are vulnerable, the value of Russian crude rises even if the political and regulatory risks remain. When Middle Eastern supply bottlenecks ease, the report says it may become easier for India to reduce its dependence on Russia.
Sumit Ritolia, lead analyst for modelling and refining at Kpler, told The Times of India that Russian crude has become India’s best hedge against global supply disruptions. He said Indian refiners were unlikely to immediately abandon Russian supplies unless sanctions created serious problems for shipping, insurance or payment arrangements. His assessment places the decisive constraint not on political statements but on whether the infrastructure of international oil trade remains usable.
The policy landscape is therefore defined by several institutions acting at once. The US Congress has created the potential tariff mechanism. The US President will decide whether and how to use it. Sanctions authorities can affect Russian oil companies and trading arrangements. Indian refiners will assess crude prices, freight, insurance and payment channels. The Indian government must weigh energy affordability, export access and the broader relationship with Washington.
China further complicates that calculation. The report says China buys more Russian crude than India, but that Washington may put greater pressure on New Delhi because of concerns about possible Chinese retaliation. Whether or not that assessment proves correct, it highlights an asymmetry in the proposed mechanism: the same legal power may produce different diplomatic and commercial pressure on different buyers.
The evidence supports three conclusions. First, Russia’s role in India’s crude basket is now large enough that an abrupt exit would carry significant energy-security implications. Second, tariffs alone have so far appeared less effective than sanctions that interfere with the practical ability to buy, ship, insure or pay for oil. Third, India’s exposure is two-sided: reducing Russian purchases may increase supply risk, while maintaining them could expose Indian exports to US trade action.
What remains unresolved is the part that will determine the next phase of the dispute. The US House vote does not establish that a 100% tariff will be imposed. The final decision will depend on presidential action, the rate and scope of any measure, and the implementation timetable. Until those details are announced, Russian crude is likely to remain a central part of India’s supply mix, particularly while Middle Eastern disruptions continue. The developments to monitor are the President’s decision, any change in sanctions affecting Russian oil companies and the response of Indian refiners to shipping, insurance and payment conditions.
