India’s crude oil imports reached a record around 5.6 million barrels per day in October as refiners increased purchases from both the Middle East and Russia. The number is more than a trade statistic: it shows how India’s energy system is balancing availability, freight costs, sanctions-related risks and the security of supplies moving through vulnerable maritime routes.
The latest pattern, reported by Times of India citing energy intelligence firm Kpler, places Middle Eastern supplies at about 2.3 million barrels per day and Russian shipments at nearly 2 million barrels per day. Together, the two sources accounted for most of the reported import flow. The rise in Gulf supplies followed improved movement through the Strait of Hormuz, while Russian crude continued to retain a substantial position in the Indian market.
That combination matters because India imports nearly 90 per cent of the crude oil it requires. Refiners therefore do not make procurement decisions only on the basis of the headline price of a barrel. Availability, insurance and transport conditions, the cost of moving cargoes and the final landed price all influence which grades can be bought and processed competitively.
Kpler lead analyst Nikhil Dubey, quoted by PTI, said more crude was moving through the Strait of Hormuz in September and October, helped by increased ship-to-ship transfers. Gulf producers were also offering competitive delivered prices as they sought to regain market share in India. The result was a stronger flow of Middle Eastern crude into a market that had continued to rely heavily on Russian barrels.
The Strait of Hormuz is central to this calculation. Any disruption affecting the route could make Gulf supplies more difficult to secure, even if producers remain willing to sell. The report says a renewed disruption could prompt Indian refiners to return to Russian crude, despite higher freight costs. In other words, the composition of India’s oil basket is not being determined by a single long-term preference. It is being adjusted according to the relative risks and costs attached to different supply corridors.
Russian crude became a major part of that calculation after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. European Union restrictions on seaborne Russian crude, the G7 price cap and the withdrawal of European refiners from much of that trade forced Moscow to seek alternative buyers. India emerged as one of the largest destinations after Russian producers offered steep discounts to attract new customers.
According to the supplied report, Russian crude accounted for as much as 40 to 50 per cent of India’s oil basket at its peak. The price incentive was particularly strong in late 2022 and early 2023, when Russian Urals crude traded at discounts of around $30 per barrel to Brent at times. Those discounts helped make the supply attractive to Indian refiners seeking to reduce input costs.
The discount advantage has since narrowed, but Russian shipments have remained substantial. The explanation is not simply that Russian crude remains cheap. Middle Eastern supply disruptions have made alternative sources important to India’s energy security, while Russian cargoes have continued to offer a significant option within a diversified procurement strategy.
The latest data suggests that this strategy is entering a more volatile phase. Dubey said Russian shipments could moderate in November and December as attacks in the Black Sea push freight rates higher. Once transport costs are included, the price advantage of Russian crude may become less compelling for Indian refiners.
This is a significant distinction for the wider economy. A lower quoted price at the point of production does not necessarily translate into a lower cost when a cargo reaches an Indian refinery. Freight rates, route security and the availability of ships can change the landed cost. The economics of oil procurement therefore depend on the entire supply chain rather than on the crude benchmark alone.
The pressure is particularly relevant to cities because fuel procurement sits beneath urban mobility, freight movement, construction activity and the delivery of everyday goods. The supplied report does not quantify the effect of the import shift on petrol, diesel, public transport fares or household costs. It does, however, establish the scale of India’s import dependence and the procurement conditions that shape the cost of bringing crude into the country.
The institutional actors involved are also clear. Refiners decide which crude to purchase and process. Gulf producers compete to regain Indian market share. Russian suppliers seek to preserve access to one of their most important alternative markets. Shipping and freight conditions influence the commercial attractiveness of each route. The Strait of Hormuz and the Black Sea operate as strategic points in this system, even though neither is controlled by Indian refiners.
The October 16 waiver under the Graham Act could further affect those decisions, according to Dubey. The waiver may ease concerns among some Indian buyers about the risks associated with purchasing Russian oil, giving them greater flexibility in sourcing supplies. The report does not specify the full operational scope or duration of the waiver, but it identifies the measure as another factor that could influence procurement choices.
The numbers show both concentration and diversification. Middle Eastern supplies at about 2.3 million barrels per day and Russian shipments near 2 million barrels per day indicate that India is drawing heavily from two major external sources. At the same time, the movement between those sources shows that diversification does not eliminate vulnerability. It can instead shift the country’s exposure from one set of risks to another: sanctions and freight costs in the case of Russian crude, and maritime-route disruption in the case of Gulf supplies.
India’s record import level also raises a question about what the volume represents. The supplied material does not establish whether the October figure reflects a lasting increase in domestic demand, a temporary procurement decision, stock-building or changes in refinery purchasing patterns. It does show that refiners stepped up purchases while access to Gulf shipments improved and Russian supply remained strong. The reason for the record must therefore be interpreted through sourcing conditions rather than treated as a standalone demand indicator.
For urban India, the immediate significance lies in the dependence of city systems on decisions made far beyond municipal boundaries. Roads, logistics networks, construction sites and industrial supply chains rely on fuels whose availability and cost are shaped by global shipping routes and geopolitical restrictions. Municipal administrations may manage local transport and infrastructure, but they do not control the international procurement conditions that influence the energy inputs used by those systems.
The evidence confirms that India’s oil sourcing remains flexible but exposed. Gulf suppliers are regaining ground because deliveries through the Strait of Hormuz have improved and delivered prices are competitive. Russian crude remains important but may face higher freight costs because of Black Sea attacks. The next phase will depend on whether Hormuz flows remain reliable, how Russian transport costs develop and how refiners assess the landed cost of each source in November and December.
