Hyderabad’s regional air-connectivity network has expanded on paper but remains fragile in operation. An RTI-based review of Airports Authority of India data found that 14 of the 60 route sectors sanctioned under the Centre’s Ude Desh ka Aam Naagrik, or UDAN, scheme are either non-operational or yet to commence. The finding exposes a gap between awarding a route and creating a dependable transport connection for smaller cities.
The figures reported by the Times of India are significant because UDAN is designed to use viability-gap funding, or VGF, to make flights to underserved and unserved airports commercially possible. Yet 12 Hyderabad-linked sectors are marked non-operational, while two proposed seaplane services have not started because the required water aerodromes are not ready. The result is a network in which administrative approval, financial support and actual passenger service do not always move together.
The stalled routes include Hyderabad connections to Vidyanagar, Jamnagar, Gwalior, Kishangarh and Gondia. Hyderabad-Vidyanagar is the clearest example of how route allocation alone does not guarantee continuity. The sector was first awarded in 2017 to a regional airline that later ceased operations. It was awarded again in 2022 to a Delhi-based airline, but the service remained non-operational. The repeated award of the route, followed by continued non-operation, points to a problem deeper than the absence of a single operator.
The Hyderabad-Prakasam Barrage seaplane service illustrates a different weakness: infrastructure readiness. Awarded in August 2022, the service remains on paper because the required water aerodrome has not been made ready. The route was novated in March 2026 from a Haryana-based aviation firm to a seaplane operator, but flights had still not commenced, according to the report. In this case, the route’s status depends not only on airline economics but also on whether the public and physical infrastructure needed to operate it exists.
These cases show that regional air connectivity is an interlocking system. Airlines need aircraft and viable passenger demand. Airports and water aerodromes need operational readiness. State governments must identify and prioritise suitable locations. The Centre and aviation authorities must design support that keeps routes alive long enough to develop demand. If any one of these elements is weak, a sanctioned sector can remain unused even after public money has been committed.
The passenger data from Hyderabad indicates that demand has not followed a steady upward trajectory. Passengers using operational UDAN routes rose from 51,000 in 2017-18 to 3.56 lakh in 2019-20. Traffic stood at 3.61 lakh in 2020-21, before falling sharply to 0.96 lakh in 2024-25. It recovered to 1.6 lakh in 2025-26, but that was still about 53% below the 2019-20 peak.
The recovery is therefore not enough to establish that the regional network has returned to its earlier level. The available data does not explain the entire fall, and the report does not attribute it to one cause. However, sources cited by the Times of India identify low occupancy, limited aircraft availability and rising operating costs as factors that have made several routes difficult to sustain. These pressures are especially important on connections to tier-2 and tier-3 cities, where demand for air travel may be thinner and more sensitive to fares, schedules and reliability.
This creates a basic policy tension. UDAN is intended to make air travel accessible to a wider population, but subsidised fares cannot by themselves create a durable market. Passengers also need convenient timings, dependable frequency, a reason to travel and reliable connections at both ends. For smaller cities, the service may support business, education, healthcare and administrative travel, but those potential benefits become difficult to realise if flights are irregular or disappear after the initial support period.
The financial record underscores the scale of the state’s intervention. RTI data cited in the report shows that more than ₹660 crore in VGF claims was disbursed to airlines operating UDAN routes from Telangana between 2017-18 and 2025-26. The highest annual payout was ₹141.50 crore in 2021-22, when passenger traffic stood at 2.39 lakh. The figures do not, by themselves, establish whether the expenditure produced value for money. They do show that the route network has required substantial public support over several years.
VGF is meant to bridge the gap between the cost of operating a flight and the revenue that can be generated while a route is developing. That design assumes that some routes will eventually become commercially sustainable. The Hyderabad data raises the question of how often that transition is occurring and how clearly it is being measured. A route that survives only while support continues may meet a short-term connectivity objective, but it remains vulnerable if passenger volumes, costs or aircraft availability change.
The minister of state for civil aviation, Murlidhar Mohol, told the Rajya Sabha that state governments have been entrusted with identifying and prioritising high-potential aerodromes, while airlines must submit business plans before routes are awarded. He also said the next phase of UDAN would strengthen route sustainability through longer-duration VGF support with a tapered mechanism, giving routes more time to mature.
That proposed shift recognises that route development cannot always be assessed within a short initial period. A tapered subsidy could allow support to reduce as passenger numbers and revenues improve rather than ending abruptly. But longer support also makes route selection and performance monitoring more important. The supplied report does not provide the criteria that will be used to define a high-potential aerodrome, the duration of the revised support, or the performance milestones attached to it.
The operator changes in Hyderabad’s network further complicate the picture. Several routes initially awarded to Tru Jet, SpiceJet, Alliance Air and Big Charter have changed operators. Hyderabad-Kadapa, originally awarded to Tru Jet, is now operated commercially by IndiGo. Hyderabad-Puducherry, initially awarded to SpiceJet, is listed as commercially operational by IndiGo. Other sectors, including Hyderabad-Belgaum, Hyderabad-Mysore, Hyderabad-Hubli and Hyderabad-Nashik, have continued beyond their original UDAN period and are listed as commercial or non-RCS operations.
These transitions are important because they separate two different outcomes that can otherwise be treated as the same. A route may fail under the original regional-connectivity arrangement but later survive commercially with another operator. Conversely, a route may remain on an official list while not carrying passengers at all. For citizens, the relevant measure is not whether a sector was once awarded or whether it appears in a government programme. It is whether a usable and dependable service is available when needed.
The Hyderabad experience also highlights the administrative fragmentation behind regional aviation. The Centre determines the broader scheme and subsidy framework. The AAI maintains information on route sectors and airport operations. State governments have a role in identifying and prioritising aerodromes. Airlines decide whether aircraft and crew can be deployed at viable costs. Local infrastructure agencies may be responsible for facilities such as water aerodromes. These responsibilities must align for a route to move from policy document to daily service.
The two unstarted seaplane sectors demonstrate why physical infrastructure should be treated as a precondition rather than a follow-up task. Awarding a service before the water aerodrome is ready creates a route that exists administratively but not operationally. The Hyderabad-Prakasam Barrage case, including its 2026 operator change, shows that changing the concessionaire or operator cannot substitute for missing infrastructure.
The evidence therefore supports a more precise assessment of UDAN’s performance. The scheme has created routes, supported airlines and enabled traffic growth from Hyderabad during its early years. It has also seen route withdrawals, operator changes, substantial subsidy claims and a sharp decline from the 2019-20 passenger peak. Fourteen of 60 sectors being non-operational or yet to commence means that approximately one in four sanctioned sectors is not currently delivering the connectivity implied by its award.
What remains unclear from the supplied data is how many of the operational routes are financially self-sustaining, how VGF is distributed by sector, and whether passenger traffic differs substantially between routes that have become commercial and those that remain dependent on subsidy. Those details would be necessary to assess the programme’s efficiency beyond the headline count of sanctioned sectors.
For Hyderabad, the next test will be whether the revised approach to VGF can convert temporary support into stable services and whether proposed routes are matched by ready infrastructure and credible demand assessments. The central urban question is not simply how many destinations appear on a route map. It is whether public investment produces reliable connections that residents and smaller cities can use over time.
