BEST’s financial improvement in 2025-26 presents Mumbai with a difficult public-transport equation: the bus undertaking earned more after raising fares, but daily ridership fell by an estimated 2-4 lakh passengers. The figures presented to the BEST Committee show that a stronger balance sheet does not automatically mean a stronger bus service, particularly when the improvement is partly linked to higher fares and increased municipal support.
According to information presented by BEST officials at the committee meeting, the transport department’s income rose from Rs 1,640 crore in 2024-25 to Rs 2,137 crore in 2025-26, an increase of Rs 497.25 crore. The department’s deficit fell by Rs 540.46 crore. The overall BEST undertaking’s deficit also declined, from about Rs 1,361 crore in 2024-25 to approximately Rs 740 crore in 2025-26, a reduction of around Rs 739.97 crore.
The immediate trigger was the fare increase introduced in May 2025. The minimum fare for non-air-conditioned buses doubled from Rs 5 to Rs 10, while the minimum fare for air-conditioned buses increased from Rs 6 to Rs 12. After the revision, the number of people travelling by BEST buses each day fell from an estimated 25-27 lakh to around 21-23 lakh, according to the figures reported at the meeting.
That decline matters because ridership is not only a measure of revenue. It is also a measure of the reach of a public transport system. A bus network can improve its financial position by collecting more from each passenger even while serving fewer passengers. For a civic undertaking, that creates a tension between financial recovery and the objective of maintaining affordable, widely used mobility across Mumbai.
The supplied figures do not establish how many passengers stopped travelling because of the fare increase, shifted to other modes, travelled less often or were affected by other changes in the network. They do, however, show that the fall in passenger numbers occurred after the fare revision and alongside an increase in ticket income. BEST officials have attributed the higher earnings to the fare increase, greater income from wet-lease buses, other income and increased financial assistance from the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation.
The composition of the fleet helps explain why the revenue story is not simply a fare story. BEST currently has 2,834 buses, but only 249 are owned by the undertaking. The remaining buses operate under wet-lease arrangements. Under this model, buses are operated through contracts while the undertaking remains responsible for the public transport service and its overall network role. The figures presented to the committee show that ticket income from wet-lease buses increased by Rs 235.30 crore. Ticket income from BEST-owned buses, by contrast, declined by Rs 6.31 crore.
This difference is institutionally important. It indicates that the reported improvement was shaped not only by what passengers paid, but also by the changing contribution of different parts of the fleet. The figures do not provide the number of trips, route-level performance, operating costs or contract payments associated with wet-lease buses. Without those details, the revenue increase cannot by itself be treated as a complete measure of operational efficiency.
Other income categories made smaller contributions. Income from reserved bus services rose by Rs 2.65 crore, while monthly bus-pass income increased by only Rs 0.42 crore. The limited movement in monthly pass income is relevant because passes are generally linked to regular use rather than one-off travel. The supplied material does not specify whether the fare changes altered the number of pass holders, the price of passes or the frequency with which pass users travelled.
The municipal corporation’s role is equally central. The grant provided by the BMC to BEST’s bus department increased from Rs 794.52 crore in 2024-25 to Rs 1,000 crore in 2025-26, an increase of Rs 205.48 crore. BEST has also sought an additional Rs 350 crore from the BMC. The undertaking has received more than Rs 800 crore from the corporation so far this year, according to the report.
This means the reduction in the transport department’s deficit has two distinct components: higher operating income and greater public financial support. The report states that the bus department’s financial position improved even when BMC assistance was excluded from the comparison. That is a significant point, but the available figures do not provide a complete account of expenditure, lease obligations, maintenance costs, fuel or energy costs, staffing and route operations. The net position therefore explains the direction of change without fully explaining the cost structure behind it.
For Mumbai’s transport system, the central question is whether the revenue improvement can be sustained without further narrowing access to bus travel. The fare increase produced a clear short-term financial effect in the figures presented to the committee. But the decline from 25-27 lakh daily passengers to 21-23 lakh also shows that price changes can affect demand at the scale of a citywide service. A reduction of 2-4 lakh daily passengers is not a marginal variation when the undertaking serves millions of journeys.
The pressure is particularly visible in the contrast between ticket revenue and ridership. Ticket income increased even though the reported number of daily passengers decreased. That relationship may help BEST address its immediate deficit, but it also means that revenue growth is not equivalent to growth in public transport use. The available material does not identify the social or geographic profile of the passengers who stopped using the buses, nor does it state whether lower-income passengers were disproportionately affected.
The fleet figures add another layer to the policy issue. With only 249 of 2,834 buses owned by BEST, the undertaking’s service is heavily dependent on wet-lease buses. The reported Rs 235.30 crore increase in ticket income from those buses suggests that they are an important part of the current revenue structure. At the same time, the supplied information does not say whether wet-lease operations have changed service frequency, route coverage, reliability or the cost of providing each kilometre of service.
That distinction matters because Mumbai’s bus system is not only a fare-collection mechanism. It connects neighbourhoods to railway stations, commercial districts and other modes of transport. The financial figures presented at the committee meeting focus on income and deficits, while the available report does not provide equivalent data on punctuality, overcrowding, cancellations, route withdrawals or passenger waiting times. The financial recovery can therefore be assessed from the numbers supplied, but the quality and breadth of the service cannot be judged from them alone.
BEST had estimated that the fare increase could generate approximately Rs 590 crore in additional ticket income over a full year. Officials said the complete annual effect of the fare revision would be clearer in the next accounts. That qualification is important. The current figures cover a period in which the fare increase had not necessarily operated for a full accounting year, according to the report. A complete-year comparison may show whether the initial revenue gain continues, changes or is offset by further ridership movement.
The BMC’s grants also place BEST’s finances within a wider municipal framework. The undertaking’s ability to maintain bus services is linked not only to passenger payments but also to decisions about civic funding. The increase in the grant from Rs 794.52 crore to Rs 1,000 crore shows that public support remains a major part of the bus department’s financial structure. BEST’s request for another Rs 350 crore indicates that the improved deficit position has not removed the need for continued municipal assistance.
This is the larger urban issue behind the headline numbers. Mumbai’s bus system is being asked to perform two roles at once: operate as a financially more sustainable undertaking and remain an affordable mass-mobility service. Higher fares may improve revenue per passenger, but lower ridership can weaken the network effect that makes buses useful to the city. Greater municipal funding can protect operations, but it also shifts more of the system’s cost to the public budget.
The evidence currently confirms four points. BEST’s transport income rose by Rs 497.25 crore to Rs 2,137 crore in 2025-26; its reported daily ridership fell by 2-4 lakh after the May 2025 fare increase; wet-lease buses contributed substantially to the rise in ticket income; and BMC assistance increased by Rs 205.48 crore. What remains unclear is how much of the ridership decline was directly caused by the fare revision, how the additional revenue compares with operating costs and which passenger groups were most affected.
The next accounts, which BEST officials said would show the full-year impact of the fare increase more clearly, will be important for assessing whether the financial improvement represents a durable recovery or a short-term gain achieved through higher fares and increased civic support.
