India is unlikely to support a common BRICS currency when leaders meet in New Delhi on September 12 and 13. Instead, the country appears to be advancing a more limited and technically complex alternative: linking national payment systems and exploring interoperability between central bank digital currencies, including India’s digital rupee.
The distinction is important. A common BRICS currency would require participating countries to create and govern a new monetary unit. Interoperable payment systems would allow countries to retain the rupee, yuan, rouble and other national currencies while making it easier to settle transactions across borders. The first is a monetary and political project. The second is a payments-infrastructure project.
Reporting by The Economic Times said India was likely to propose seamless cross-border digital payments and greater adoption of central bank digital currencies among BRICS members at the New Delhi summit. The report, citing people familiar with the deliberations, also said the final list of issues for the leaders had not been settled. That uncertainty is significant: the proposal has moved closer to the political agenda, but it has not yet become an agreed BRICS programme.
India’s position on a common currency is clearer. Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal said after a meeting of BRICS trade and industry ministers in Jaipur on August 7 that India opposed introducing a BRICS currency. “We are not in favour of a BRICS currency. We do not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme; India opposes it,” Goyal said, according to PTI.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had also indicated in December 2024 that BRICS countries were not seeking to weaken the US dollar. His remarks followed warnings from then US President-elect Donald Trump, who threatened 100% tariffs against BRICS members if they created a common currency or supported another currency intended to replace the dollar. Trump repeated that position after taking office in January 2025.
India’s alternative is consistent with its broader effort to expand the use of digital payments without formally presenting the initiative as a campaign to displace the dollar. The Reserve Bank of India launched the retail pilot of the digital rupee, or e₹, in December 2022. In January 2026, Reuters reported that the RBI had recommended placing the linking of BRICS central bank digital currencies on the agenda for India’s BRICS presidency.
That recommendation was not an approved bloc-wide proposal. It was an RBI suggestion to the government, based on the possibility that official digital currencies could be connected to make cross-border trade and tourism payments faster and less expensive. The proposal built on a BRICS declaration adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 2025, which supported greater interoperability between members’ payment systems.
A central distinction is between the digital rupee and the Unified Payments Interface. When a person sends Rs 500 through UPI, the system functions as a payment rail through which money moves between bank accounts. The underlying funds are commercial bank deposits. With a CBDC, the digital money itself is issued by the central bank. Linking CBDCs would therefore involve connecting sovereign digital currencies and the systems through which they are transferred.
For businesses and travellers, the attraction is straightforward. Cross-border transactions could potentially involve fewer intermediaries, lower costs and faster settlement. A payment made by a visitor, importer or exporter could move through linked official systems rather than relying entirely on existing correspondent banking arrangements. However, the existence of a digital currency does not by itself resolve the institutional and commercial problems that make international settlement difficult.
RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra confirmed in Mumbai on August 11 that BRICS members were discussing both CBDCs and connections between fast-payment systems. “Cross-border payments is an area of interest for all of us, including the BRICS, because we feel there is a lot of scope for reducing cost,” Malhotra said, according to Reuters. “Various options are on the table, but it is still at discussion stage, including CBDCs and linkages of fast payment systems.”
His statement places the proposal at an exploratory stage. It confirms that the issue is under discussion, but not that BRICS countries have selected a technical model, agreed on common rules or committed to a shared network. Those decisions would determine whether the proposal could move from political language to operational infrastructure.
The technical challenge is interoperability. Member countries would need systems capable of communicating with one another, along with common or compatible rules for identity, security, transaction authentication, data exchange and settlement. They would also need to determine how disputes are handled, which institution oversees the network and how transactions are converted or settled when participants use different national currencies.
The regulatory challenge is equally significant. Cross-border payments involve rules covering capital movement, anti-money-laundering controls, sanctions, consumer protection, data governance and central-bank oversight. A technical connection between payment systems cannot automatically make those legal frameworks compatible. Each participating country would have to decide how much access foreign users, banks and payment providers receive and how domestic controls apply to international transactions.
The proposal also faces a question of technological trust. Reuters reported in January that reluctance among countries to adopt platforms developed elsewhere could delay progress. A shared system would require participants to accept common standards without giving one country undue control over the network. The choice between building a new architecture and connecting existing systems would have consequences for cost, speed, security and governance.
Trade imbalances create another obstacle. India and Russia have already encountered difficulties while attempting to settle more trade in national currencies. After India’s imports from Russia increased following the Ukraine war, Russia accumulated large balances in Indian rupees because it was selling more to India than it was buying. The resulting balances could not simply be spent on an equivalent volume of Indian goods and services.
The RBI subsequently permitted such balances to be invested in Indian securities. Reuters also reported that central-bank foreign-exchange swaps and periodic settlements were among the mechanisms being considered to manage imbalances. This shows why payment interoperability is not the same as trade settlement. A transaction can be completed digitally, but the receiving country still needs a practical way to use or convert the currency it accumulates.
Russia’s recent statements add another layer to the discussion. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said on September 8 that Russia was not seeking de-dollarisation and was open to acceptable methods of payment. He also said that 90% of transactions between Russia and BRICS nations were being conducted in national currencies and that the problem of Russian companies accumulating excess Indian rupees was gradually being resolved.
The statements from India and Russia suggest that the immediate BRICS conversation may be less about creating a rival currency than about reducing friction in existing trade. That approach allows members to discuss payment efficiency without agreeing on a new unit of account or presenting the initiative as a direct challenge to the dollar. It also leaves open the possibility of gradual experimentation through bilateral or limited-purpose connections.
The policy landscape remains unsettled. India’s central bank has recommended that CBDC links be discussed, the RBI governor has confirmed that CBDCs and fast-payment connections are on the table, and The Economic Times has reported that New Delhi may raise the issue at the summit. But the supplied reporting does not establish that BRICS leaders will approve a network, adopt a timetable or agree on a specific technical design.
The same distinction applies to the role of UPI. India’s fast-payment system is a domestic infrastructure with international linkage initiatives, while the digital rupee is sovereign digital money issued by the RBI. A BRICS arrangement could involve CBDCs, fast-payment systems or both. Until the participating countries define the architecture, it is not possible to treat the proposal as a single established platform.
The broader urban and infrastructure question is how financial connectivity is built across jurisdictions. Payment systems are invisible public infrastructure for businesses, tourists and governments. Their effectiveness depends not only on the speed of an application or the availability of digital wallets, but also on institutional trust, regulatory coordination, currency convertibility and the ability to manage unequal flows of money.
For India, the New Delhi summit therefore presents two different agendas. One is the symbolic debate over whether BRICS should create a common currency. The other is the practical effort to connect systems that already exist. The second agenda is narrower, but it may be more compatible with national control over monetary systems and with the immediate objective of lowering cross-border payment costs.
What the summit ultimately produces remains to be determined. The evidence currently confirms that India opposes a common BRICS currency, supports discussions on payment interoperability and is examining CBDC connections as one possible mechanism. It does not yet confirm a bloc-wide agreement. The next developments to monitor are the leaders’ final agenda, any formal decision on CBDC or fast-payment linkages, and the mechanisms proposed to address technology standards, regulation and trade imbalances.
