Subheadline: One year after the five-corporation model took charge, persistent service failures and the absence of elected representatives continue to test the promise of decentralised governance.
Standfirst: The Greater Bengaluru Authority completed its first year of full administrative operations on September 2, 2026, after replacing the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike with a five-corporation structure covering 369 wards. The reform was intended to take civic administration closer to residents and improve coordination among the agencies that shape daily life in the city. Yet the problems cited by residents and political representatives remain familiar: poor roads, drainage failures, waste-management concerns, traffic, property-tax reassessment, e-khata issues and shortages of frontline staff. This analysis examines what the first year reveals about the difference between administrative restructuring and effective decentralisation. It also considers how the continuing absence of elected civic representatives affects accountability, ward-level scrutiny and the credibility of the new system.
The Greater Bengaluru Authority has completed a year of full administrative control, but the evidence in the first-year assessment points to a gap between changing the city’s institutional map and changing how civic services are delivered. The five-corporation model was introduced to decentralise governance, while the GBA was assigned the role of coordinating the corporations. Residents, however, continue to encounter many of the same problems associated with the earlier system.
The administrative transition followed the Greater Bengaluru Governance Act, which came into force on May 15, 2025. The government constituted the GBA apex body on August 26 that year and issued the final notification dissolving the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike on September 2. The GBA assumed full administrative control on that date. The new structure divided the city among five corporations covering 369 wards, with the authority positioned above them for coordination.
That arrangement was the outcome of several years of legislative and administrative preparation. The ward count had been revised from 243 in 2021 to 225 in 2023. The B S Patil-led reform committee submitted the draft Greater Bengaluru Bill in February 2024. Following legislative scrutiny and amendments, the Governor gave assent to the legislation on April 24, 2025. The sequence established the legal foundation for the new model, but the first year has shifted attention from the design of the system to its working capacity.
The central question is whether five corporations have created genuinely decentralised decision-making or simply redistributed administrative titles. Residents quoted in the first-year assessment described the visible change as an increase in the number of commissioners rather than a fundamental change in civic administration. Ajit H, a technology professional, said problems involving roads, drainage, waste management, traffic, property-tax reassessment and e-khata continued to affect neighbourhoods.
The criticism is significant because these issues sit at the point where city governance becomes visible to residents. Roads and drainage require local planning, engineering capacity and coordination with utility agencies. Waste management depends on staffing, contracts and regular supervision. Property-tax and e-khata matters require administrative clarity and functioning digital and ward-level systems. The persistence of problems across these areas suggests that the first year cannot be assessed only by the creation of new corporations or the appointment of commissioners.
Rajajinagar MLA S Suresh Kumar argued that the restructuring had not brought administration closer to citizens. His assessment was that five corporation commissioners had replaced eight zonal joint commissioners without receiving sufficient additional powers. In that account, the reform changed the administrative arrangement but did not fully transfer authority to the new corporations. Suresh Kumar also claimed that some corporations faced financial difficulties and struggled to pay staff salaries.
The distinction between responsibility and authority is crucial to the GBA model. A corporation may be expected to respond to local infrastructure and public-health concerns, but if major decisions continue to move upward to the GBA chief commissioner, the system may remain centralised in practice. The first-year criticism therefore concerns not only the number of administrative units but also the powers, budgets, staff and procedures available to each unit.
Suresh Kumar acknowledged that commissioners had conducted phone-in programmes and inspected infrastructure projects. These activities indicate an effort to create more direct administrative contact and oversight. But inspections and public interactions do not by themselves establish whether decisions are being taken faster, whether projects are being completed more effectively or whether complaints are being resolved. The supplied first-year assessment does not provide performance data showing a measurable improvement on those points.
Staffing is another test of whether the corporations can function as meaningful local governments. The report cites inadequate numbers of ward engineers and health inspectors, vacancies among pourakarmikas and unresolved issues involving outsourced staff. These shortages affect the basic capacity of the system to monitor roads, sanitation, public health and waste operations. They also complicate the expectation that a decentralised structure will provide more responsive administration.
The problem is not limited to the corporations. Bengaluru’s urban services are spread across several agencies, including BESCOM, BWSSB, BMTC, BDA, Metro, BSNL and the traffic police. The first-year assessment raised concerns about weak coordination among them. A corporation can manage certain civic functions, but roads, drainage, transport, electricity, water, land development and traffic frequently overlap. Without reliable inter-agency review and decision-making, restructuring the municipal administration cannot resolve problems that cross institutional boundaries.
Suresh Kumar alleged that the regular review meetings envisaged under the new arrangement had not been held consistently. If accurate, that would point to a coordination problem within the reform’s operating framework. The GBA was created partly to bring multiple corporations and agencies into a more coherent system. Regular reviews would be one mechanism for identifying shared infrastructure conflicts and assigning responsibility. The report does not establish how many meetings were held or what decisions followed, but the allegation highlights the importance of process, not just structure.
The administration’s visible priorities have also shaped public perceptions of the first year. Authorities have focused on clearing footpaths and removing abandoned vehicles. Those actions may address specific public-space and enforcement concerns, but residents cited in the assessment said they did not resolve larger civic problems. This contrast illustrates the difference between interventions that are immediately visible and the slower institutional work required to improve drainage, roads, waste systems, staffing and inter-agency coordination.
The most consequential unresolved issue is political representation. The term of the BBMP corporators ended on October 2, 2020, and Bengaluru has remained without an elected civic council since then. The five-corporation structure was created as an administrative reform, but residents still lack elected ward representatives through whom they can question civic decisions, scrutinise spending and raise neighbourhood concerns within a formal council system.
The government is required to conduct elections to the five corporations by December 31, 2026, but no polling schedule has been announced. The absence of a schedule leaves a constitutional and administrative deadline ahead without a publicly defined electoral process in the material supplied for this assessment. It also means that the GBA’s first year has been judged largely through officials, legislators and residents rather than through the functioning of an elected civic council.
An elected council would not automatically solve the city’s infrastructure or staffing problems. It would, however, create a formal layer of ward-level representation and political scrutiny. It would also provide residents with a recognised forum for questioning civic decisions. In a system where administrative responsibilities are divided among five corporations and multiple agencies, that representative layer could clarify who is answerable for local failures. The first-year debate is therefore about both service delivery and the kind of accountability the new structure is intended to provide.
The evidence available from the first year confirms that the GBA has completed a major institutional transition: the BBMP has been dissolved, five corporations cover 369 wards and the GBA coordinates their work. It does not yet establish that the restructuring has improved outcomes across roads, drainage, waste, staffing or inter-agency coordination. Nor does it show that decision-making has moved decisively closer to residents.
The next stage will be defined by whether the corporations receive adequate authority and staffing, whether coordination mechanisms operate regularly, and whether civic elections are held within the mandated timeframe. Until those questions are answered, Bengaluru’s experience suggests that decentralisation cannot be measured by the number of commissioners or corporations alone. Its credibility will depend on whether the new system produces accountable decisions and more reliable services at neighbourhood level.
