The dispute between Gulf airlines and Adani Airport Holdings over the proposed shift of international operations from Mumbai airport to Navi Mumbai is not simply a disagreement over airline schedules. It is an early test of whether Mumbai can move from a single-airport model to a coordinated dual-airport system without disrupting the historic rights, bilateral arrangements and passenger flows that have accumulated around its existing airport.
Adani Airport Holdings has proposed reducing Mumbai airport’s official capacity by five million passengers per annum for the summer 2027 schedule, which begins in April 2027, citing redevelopment and capacity constraints. It has also proposed moving 12 airlines to Navi Mumbai International Airport, which it operates as well. Eleven of those carriers are from the Gulf and West Asia. Gulf Air and Saudia are opposing the proposal, arguing that Mumbai airport cannot unilaterally remove or reduce their established slots without adequate approvals, criteria and consultation.
The disagreement reveals the administrative complexity behind the planned transition. Navi Mumbai airport is around 50 km from Mumbai airport, but the two facilities are being treated as part of one metropolitan aviation system. Moving an airline from one airport to the other is therefore not only a matter of assigning spare terminal capacity. It affects passenger access, airline networks, airport economics, bilateral air-service arrangements and the way India’s civil aviation authorities manage scarce slots.
Gulf Air, which operates twice daily from Mumbai, said in an email cited by Hindustan Times that Mumbai International Airport Limited, or MIAL, “cannot unilaterally reduce airport capacity, disregard established historical slot entitlements, or compel Gulf Air to surrender its existing operational positions based on a redevelopment plan”. The airline said it could escalate the matter to the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs and the International Air Transport Association. It also referred to possible reciprocal measures under applicable bilateral air-service arrangements.
Saudia has challenged the process, reasoning and transparency of the proposed reduction separately. Its objection carries an additional operational dimension because Mumbai is an important departure point for passengers travelling to Saudi Arabia for Hajj and Umrah. Saudia said the decision had “direct implications” for those operations and pointed to its role as the national carrier of Saudi Arabia in facilitating pilgrim movement between India and the Kingdom.
The Hajj figures cited in the report show why the airport dispute extends beyond corporate scheduling. India’s proposed pilgrim count is 175,025, while Mumbai accounted for nearly 15% of India’s Hajj pilgrims in 2026, or more than 26,000 people, according to government data cited by the report. The Haj Committee of India’s guidelines say the 2027 Hajj charter flights are planned between 8 April and 9 May. Umrah travel takes place throughout the year, creating a continuing passenger flow that is not limited to one annual movement window.
The immediate question is whether established slots can be altered as part of an airport redevelopment plan. Gulf Air has asked MIAL to provide a copy of any Ministry of Civil Aviation approval for the capacity reduction, the criteria used to decide which airlines and slots would be affected, and an explanation of why an additional reduction is required. These requests point to a larger governance issue: the absence, at least in the material supplied, of a publicly established framework explaining how airlines will be selected for relocation and how their historical operating positions will be treated.
Airport capacity is often described in annual passenger terms, but airlines experience it through individual arrival and departure slots, terminal facilities, aircraft turnaround requirements and access to connecting passengers. A reduction of five million passengers per year therefore has to be translated into decisions about specific carriers and time windows. If those decisions are not seen as transparent, a capacity-management exercise can quickly become a dispute over commercial rights and regulatory authority.
The proposed shift also exposes the difference between building a second airport and making it function as part of a metropolitan network. Navi Mumbai can provide additional physical capacity, but the value of that capacity depends on whether passengers accept the location, whether airlines can maintain commercially viable schedules, and whether the two airports are connected by reliable surface transport. The source material does not establish the transport arrangements or passenger incentives that would support the transfer. That absence is significant because airport capacity is useful only when it is operationally accessible to both airlines and travellers.
For international carriers, the location of an airport is tied to established demand, partnerships and passenger expectations. Gulf Air’s objection that the proposal would effectively push its entire international operation out of Terminal 2 at Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport reflects the practical consequences of relocation. The issue is not merely whether flights can be accommodated elsewhere, but whether the move changes the market and operating conditions under which those flights were scheduled.
The institutional structure adds another layer. MIAL is a joint venture between Adani Airport and the Airports Authority of India. Adani Airport Holdings therefore has a direct role in both the existing Mumbai airport and the new Navi Mumbai airport, while the proposed changes also involve the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the DGCA, IATA and the civil aviation authorities of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The dispute could consequently move across airport management, Indian regulation, international aviation coordination and diplomatic channels.
That multi-level structure is what makes the transition difficult. A private airport operator may need to manage congestion and redevelopment within its facility, but airlines operate under regulatory permissions and bilateral arrangements that extend beyond the airport boundary. The operator’s redevelopment timetable may therefore not be sufficient, on its own, to determine how international capacity is redistributed.
The possibility of reciprocal action is especially important. Gulf Air has referred to measures under bilateral air-service arrangements, and the aviation adviser quoted in the report said Gulf carriers could approach their respective governments. Such action could affect Indian carriers operating to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia if the disagreement escalates. The source does not establish that reciprocal measures will occur, but the warning shows how a domestic airport-capacity decision can acquire an international dimension.
The timing makes the issue more sensitive. MIAL wants the capacity reduction to apply from April 2027, while the planned Hajj charter period begins on 8 April. That overlap places the proposed airport transition close to a fixed and highly concentrated period of pilgrimage travel. Any uncertainty over airline schedules, terminal allocation or airport assignment would therefore have to be resolved before the charter window, rather than during it.
The dispute also raises questions about how Mumbai’s airport system will be governed after Navi Mumbai becomes operational. A dual-airport city requires more than two runways and terminals. It needs a clear allocation of airlines, transparent slot rules, coordination between airport operators and regulators, and a mechanism for handling passengers whose travel patterns are tied to particular destinations or seasonal movements. The present disagreement suggests that these rules are being tested through individual airline negotiations rather than understood by all parties as a settled public framework.
The evidence currently confirms three things. First, Mumbai airport faces redevelopment-related capacity pressure, according to Adani’s position. Second, the proposed solution involves reducing capacity at the existing airport and shifting a substantial group of international airlines to Navi Mumbai. Third, at least Gulf Air and Saudia do not accept that the change can be imposed without further approvals, explanation and consultation.
What remains unresolved is whether the Ministry of Civil Aviation has approved the proposed capacity reduction, how the affected airlines and slots were selected, and what final arrangement will apply to Hajj, Umrah and regular international services. Until those questions are answered, Navi Mumbai airport’s transition from a new facility into the second half of Mumbai’s airport system remains an institutional negotiation as much as an infrastructure project.
