India expanded its crude sourcing during the six-month Iran war, but the increase in the number of supplier countries did not translate into a broader or more balanced import base. Instead, the country’s oil supply became more concentrated around a smaller group of major producers, led by Russia.
That is the central finding in data from analytics firm Kpler, reported by the Economic Times. Between March and August, India sourced crude from 31 countries, compared with 24 in the preceding six months. Ten countries supplied India despite having no recorded deliveries in the earlier period, while three previous suppliers disappeared from the sourcing mix.
Yet the headline number of suppliers obscures the distribution of volumes. Nine of the 10 new suppliers together accounted for only 1.4% of India’s crude imports during the six-month period. Venezuela was the exception, contributing nearly 5% of imports. The result was a sourcing network that was wider in count but not substantially more diversified in supply weight.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI, captures that distinction. The measure rose 56%, from 1,606 in the preceding six months to 2,513 between March and August. An HHI above 2,500 is considered to indicate high concentration, while a reading below 1,500 represents low concentration. On the figures reported by Kpler, India’s crude-import profile moved into the high-concentration category even as the number of supplier countries increased.
The shift was driven primarily by Russia. Russian crude accounted for 47% of India’s imports during the March-August period, up from 29% in the previous six months. Russian supplies increased by about 770,000 barrels per day to 2.25 million barrels per day. That increase almost offset an 820,000-barrel-per-day decline in supplies from Iraq, which saw its share fall to about 2% from 18%.
The changes show why supplier count alone is an incomplete measure of energy-security resilience. A country can add several suppliers while remaining heavily dependent on one or two large sources if the new flows are small or temporary. In India’s case, the distribution of import volumes became more uneven, raising the concentration index despite the appearance of geographic expansion.
The composition of the top five suppliers also changed. Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia remained among the leading sources, while Venezuela and Brazil replaced the United States and Nigeria in the top group. The five largest suppliers together accounted for 76% of India’s imports during the war period, only slightly below their 79% share in the preceding six months.
This limited change at the top is important. It suggests that the supply network absorbed disruption through substitution among major suppliers rather than through a fundamental reorganisation of import dependence. Venezuela returned as a meaningful source, with supplies of about 233,000 barrels per day. Angola added about 50,000 barrels per day, while higher volumes from Oman and Brazil provided further offsetting supply.
At the same time, Saudi supplies declined by about 300,000 barrels per day and US supplies fell by about 200,000 barrels per day. The figures indicate movement within the group of established or commercially significant suppliers, but they do not show a decisive reduction in exposure to the dominant sources.
The broader context was a period of disruption linked to the Iran war. According to the report, Indian refiners turned to additional sources as they sought incremental barrels to replace disrupted Gulf supplies. Iran, Ecuador, the Bahamas, Algeria, the Netherlands, Canada and other countries supplied crude in only one of the six months. Their participation widened the supplier list, but their limited duration or volume prevented them from materially changing the overall concentration pattern.
An industry executive cited in the report described these flows as the result of global traders finding incremental barrels for Indian refiners, rather than evidence of a major change in sourcing strategy. That distinction separates emergency procurement from durable diversification. Temporary cargoes can help refiners manage an immediate shortfall, but they do not necessarily create stable commercial routes, long-term contracts or recurring supply capacity.
India’s overall crude imports fell 5% to 4.77 million barrels per day during the six-month period. The decline in total imports also forms part of the concentration story. When total volumes fall unevenly across suppliers, the remaining large suppliers can account for a greater share even if several smaller sources are added. The HHI increase therefore reflects both the rise of Russian supplies and the changing balance among other exporters.
The data also show the difference between operational flexibility and structural resilience. Operationally, Indian refiners demonstrated the ability to source crude from more countries during a period of conflict and disrupted regional flows. Structurally, however, the import system remained dependent on a limited number of high-volume suppliers. The first capability helps manage immediate market conditions; the second determines how exposed the system remains to a major disruption affecting one of its principal sources.
This distinction is particularly relevant for an economy whose refining system depends heavily on imported crude. The report does not establish how long the new supplier relationships will last, whether the additional sources can provide consistent volumes, or whether their crude grades and commercial terms are suitable for sustained procurement. It does establish that most of the new suppliers made only a marginal contribution during the period under review.
The policy question raised by the figures is therefore not simply how many countries supply India, but how much each country contributes and how quickly that contribution can be expanded during a disruption. A supplier providing a single cargo has a different strategic significance from one capable of delivering hundreds of thousands of barrels per day over several months. The reported HHI provides one way to make that difference visible.
The numbers also illustrate the role of geography and market access in crude procurement. The changing shares of Russia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Brazil, Oman, Angola and the United States show that India’s refiners operated within a global trading system capable of redirecting cargoes. But access to alternative barrels does not eliminate concentration if the largest available flows continue to come from a small group of countries.
The increase in Russian supply was the decisive development in the six-month comparison. Russia’s share rose by 18 percentage points, from 29% to 47%, while the share of the five largest suppliers declined by only three percentage points overall. Those figures indicate that diversification at the margins was outweighed by the expansion of one dominant source.
The report also places the sourcing shift alongside uncertainty over the future of India’s Russian oil purchases. It refers to a possible US tariff threat and an associated sanctions-related debate, while noting that the reported tariff measure had stalled in the US House. The supplied material does not establish the final policy outcome, but the reference underlines the external-policy risk attached to a supply profile in which nearly half of imports came from one country during the period.
What the evidence confirms is narrower and more significant than a claim that India has failed to diversify. India did diversify in one sense: the number of supplier countries increased from 24 to 31, and new sources entered the mix. But the volume distribution became more concentrated, the HHI reached 2,513, and Russia’s share rose to 47%.
What remains uncertain is whether the marginal suppliers that appeared during the war period will become durable sources, whether the balance among the leading suppliers will change again, and how future sanctions, tariffs or regional disruptions could affect procurement. Those are the developments that will determine whether the March-August pattern was an emergency response or the beginning of a longer-term shift in India’s crude-import structure.
