India’s trade with the BRICS grouping has more than doubled in five years, but the expansion has been heavily tilted towards imports. According to figures from the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) reported by Economic Times, India’s trade deficit with the 11-member bloc reached $226.1 billion in FY2026, compared with $74.5 billion in FY2021. The figures raise a broader question about what deeper engagement with emerging-market economies means when export growth does not keep pace with import dependence.
The headline number is not simply a measure of an adverse trade balance. It also maps the changing geography of India’s goods economy. BRICS countries accounted for 41.5% of India’s merchandise imports in FY2026, up from 35.2% in FY2021. Their share of India’s exports, however, slipped marginally from 22% to 21.7%. India is therefore becoming more dependent on BRICS economies as suppliers than as destinations for Indian goods.
That divergence has emerged alongside a sharp expansion in total trade. India’s goods trade with the grouping rose from $203.1 billion in FY2021 to $417.5 billion in FY2026. But exports increased 48.8%, from $64.3 billion to $95.7 billion, while imports climbed 131.8%, from $138.8 billion to $321.8 billion. The difference between those growth rates is the central fact behind the widening deficit.
The comparison with countries outside BRICS reinforces the pattern. India’s exports to the rest of the world grew 52% between FY2021 and FY2026, slightly faster than exports to BRICS. Imports from outside the grouping rose 77.6%, to $453.9 billion, but that increase was considerably slower than the 131.8% rise in imports from BRICS economies. The issue, therefore, is not that India’s trade with BRICS has grown. It is that the bloc has become a much faster-growing source of imports than a market for Indian exports.
China, the United Arab Emirates and Russia account for most of the imbalance. Together, they represented almost 84% of India’s imports from BRICS in FY2026. China alone accounted for about 41%. Indian imports from China more than doubled, from $65.2 billion in FY2021 to $131.6 billion in FY2026. Over the same period, Indian exports to China declined 8.1%, from $21.2 billion to $19.5 billion.
This is the clearest example of the export-import asymmetry within the bloc. China has become a significantly larger source of goods for India, while India’s sales into the Chinese market have not expanded alongside that relationship. The figures supplied in the GTRI analysis do not establish the causes of every sector-level change, but they show that increased commercial engagement has not automatically translated into balanced market access.
Russia presents a different pattern. Indian imports from Russia increased more than tenfold, from $5.5 billion in FY2021 to $55.4 billion in FY2026, driven mainly by higher energy purchases. Indian exports to Russia rose from approximately $2.7 billion to $4.5 billion. The increase in bilateral trade was therefore substantial, but its composition produced a far larger increase in India’s imports than in its exports.
The UAE was India’s largest BRICS export destination in FY2026. Indian shipments to the UAE rose 124%, to $37.4 billion, while imports from the country increased 140%, to $63.9 billion. Saudi Arabia followed as India’s next-largest BRICS export market at $10.3 billion. Brazil and South Africa each accounted for approximately $7 billion, while Russia and Indonesia received about $4.5 billion each. Exports to Indonesia, Iran and Ethiopia declined compared with FY2021.
These country-level figures suggest that India’s BRICS trade challenge is concentrated rather than evenly distributed across all 11 members. A small number of relationships determine much of the aggregate deficit, while export performance varies significantly by destination. That concentration matters because a strategy focused only on expanding total trade could deepen the imbalance if new import flows continue to outpace the development of export markets.
The GTRI figures also place India’s experience within the broader structure of BRICS trade. The 11 economies exported $5.67 trillion worth of goods in 2025, equivalent to 21.6% of global merchandise exports. Their imports totalled $4.58 trillion, or 17.3% of world imports, producing an overall merchandise trade surplus of approximately $1.09 trillion.
Yet the economic weight of the grouping does not mean that its members trade extensively or evenly with one another. Intra-BRICS exports were estimated at around $1.1 trillion, or 18.8% of the members’ combined exports. Intra-BRICS imports stood at approximately $1.4 trillion, representing 29.5% of their overall imports. Measured against world trade, intra-BRICS exports accounted for 4.1% of global exports and intra-BRICS imports for 5.4% of global imports.
The evidence points to a bloc that is globally important but internally fragmented. Its members have substantial trade capacity, but commerce among them remains relatively limited compared with their total trade with the rest of the world. For India, this means that membership in a large economic grouping does not by itself create a functioning export platform. Market access, product competitiveness, logistics and the structure of demand still determine whether trade expansion benefits domestic producers.
The distribution of intra-BRICS trade is also highly uneven. China sits at the centre of the network, exporting $550.8 billion in goods to other BRICS members and importing $464.9 billion from them. India recorded the largest trade deficit within the grouping at $226.1 billion. GTRI founder Ajay Srivastava described the pattern as a China-centred hub-and-spoke arrangement rather than a balanced trading network.
That description is significant for the policy debate. A hub-and-spoke structure can increase connectivity and lower transaction costs, but it can also concentrate value, supply and bargaining power in the largest trading member. If other members mainly import manufactured goods, energy or critical inputs while exporting a narrower range of products, greater connectivity may enlarge bilateral deficits rather than correct them.
The policy landscape identified in the report includes better market access in China, Russia and Indonesia; action on non-tariff barriers; higher-value exports; improved logistics; local-currency settlements; and more diversified supply chains. These measures address different parts of the problem. Market access and non-tariff barriers concern the ability of Indian firms to sell abroad. Logistics affects the cost and reliability of those sales. Supply-chain diversification addresses the risks created by dependence on a small number of suppliers or countries.
However, the evidence also places a limit on what deeper intra-BRICS trade can achieve. If trade volumes rise without a corresponding increase in India’s export capacity, the deficit may widen further. The report therefore distinguishes between more trade and better-balanced trade. The former can be measured through gross flows; the latter depends on whether Indian companies gain durable access to overseas demand and move into products with greater value capture.
India’s overall goods trade figures show that the BRICS deficit is part of a wider imbalance. Merchandise exports rose from $291.8 billion in FY2021 to $441.5 billion in FY2026, while imports increased from $394.4 billion to $775.7 billion. The overall goods trade deficit consequently widened from $102.6 billion to $334.3 billion. The BRICS relationship is not an isolated problem, but it is a substantial component of the broader gap.
The data does not establish that every import from BRICS is economically harmful. Imports can support production, energy consumption, infrastructure and domestic supply chains. Nor does the deficit alone show whether individual trade relationships are sustainable or strategically necessary. What the figures establish is a persistent imbalance in the direction and pace of trade growth, particularly with China, Russia and the UAE.
For cities and the built environment, the connection is indirect but material. Construction, transport, energy systems and industrial supply chains depend on the cost and availability of imported goods and inputs. At the same time, the strength of India’s manufacturing and services ecosystems affects employment, logistics demand, industrial land use and the capacity of urban economies to participate in export markets. Trade policy therefore has consequences beyond ports and customs data.
The immediate evidence supports three conclusions. First, India’s trade with BRICS has become substantially larger, but not more balanced. Second, the deficit is concentrated in a few major relationships, with China, Russia and the UAE driving most of the import expansion. Third, BRICS’ collective economic weight has not produced an equally integrated or balanced internal trading system.
What remains uncertain from the supplied data is how the deficit is distributed across individual product categories, how much of the import growth supports domestic production, and which non-tariff barriers most restrict Indian exports. Those questions will determine whether the next phase of India’s BRICS engagement produces export growth or simply deeper import dependence. The key developments to monitor are changes in market access, the composition of Indian exports and whether supply-chain diversification is matched by stronger access for Indian goods.
