BRICS infrastructure finance is gaining political importance as the grouping expands, but its ability to fund and coordinate projects remains far less developed than the symbolism surrounding its leaders. The meeting of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi brings that contradiction into focus: the grouping has growing economic weight, yet its institutions still struggle to convert declarations into common systems for infrastructure, payments and investment.
BRICS began as an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China, coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill in 2001. The four countries became a political grouping in 2009, South Africa joined in 2011, and Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE entered in 2024. Indonesia joined in 2025. Saudi Arabia appears in BRICS documents as an expanded member, although Riyadh has repeatedly stopped short of formally confirming accession while continuing to participate in meetings.
The expansion has made BRICS more representative of the Global South in numerical terms. The grouping now accounts for about 49% of the world’s population, 39% of global GDP and 23% of international trade, according to the report. Its members include major manufacturing economies, energy exporters, African economies and Iran. That breadth gives BRICS greater reach in discussions on development and global finance, but it also makes consensus more difficult.
The institutional weakness is significant for any infrastructure agenda. BRICS has no treaty, permanent secretariat or common budget, and decisions are reached by consensus. In May 2026, its foreign ministers failed to issue a joint statement, with differences between Iran and the UAE over the conflict involving Iran among the obstacles. A grouping unable to agree on a common diplomatic document faces an even harder task when it must coordinate payment systems, lending priorities, project standards or cross-border infrastructure investment.
This is the central gap between BRICS’ economic scale and its operational capacity. Expansion has increased the number of countries that can potentially contribute capital, markets, technology and energy resources. It has not automatically created the administrative mechanisms needed to direct those resources towards projects. For cities and infrastructure agencies, the difference matters. Announcements about alternative finance have limited value unless they lead to predictable lending, workable currency arrangements, procurement systems and institutions capable of monitoring delivery.
The New Development Bank is the clearest existing example of BRICS’ institutional output. Established in 2015, it has approved about $42.9 billion for 139 projects covering infrastructure, water, transport and clean energy. India had 32 approved projects worth $9.53 billion by the end of 2025. These figures show that BRICS has already created a development-finance channel with relevance to the built environment.
The New Development Bank’s record is also modest when compared with the lending capacity of the World Bank and other Western-backed institutions, according to the report. Its importance therefore lies less in immediate scale than in the possibility of expanding local-currency lending, mobilising private capital and financing projects without relying entirely on institutions shaped by Western economies. Those ambitions remain dependent on the bank’s ability to manage risk, attract capital and operate across countries with different financial systems and policy priorities.
BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors have supported greater use of national currencies and faster, cheaper and safer cross-border payment systems. India is promoting a proposal to link BRICS digital currencies for cross-border payments. The stated purpose is to make settlement more efficient, not to create a common reserve currency. There is no common BRICS currency and no serious near-term prospect of replacing the dollar with one.
The technical obstacles are substantial. Member countries have incompatible payment systems, different rules on currency convertibility and major trade imbalances. India is also reluctant to create deeper financial dependence on China. These constraints affect infrastructure finance directly because large projects require long-term payments, reliable currency conversion and confidence that lenders and contractors can move money across borders.
India’s position reflects that cautious approach. New Delhi wants more options and greater strategic autonomy, but does not want BRICS to become a China-Russia-led anti-American bloc. Its interest in national currencies and interoperable payment systems is therefore not the same as announcing the end of dollar-based finance. For infrastructure developers and public authorities, this distinction is important: diversification of payment channels is more achievable than a wholesale replacement of the existing financial order.
The relationship between India and China is another test of whether BRICS can support practical economic cooperation. The 2020 Galwan clash froze much of the political relationship. Troops remained deployed along the disputed frontier, India restricted Chinese investment and apps, and direct connectivity suffered. An October 2024 disengagement agreement led to withdrawals from key friction points, followed by a gradual reopening of diplomatic and commercial channels.
The economic relationship remains difficult to separate from infrastructure and industrial supply chains. Chinese imports into India reached $113.5 billion in 2024-25, while India’s trade deficit with China reached a record $99.2 billion, according to the report. Electronics, batteries and solar equipment are among the areas in which Indian industry remains heavily dependent on Chinese supply chains. These are not only trade figures; they also relate to the equipment and manufacturing ecosystems needed for urban expansion, clean energy and transport infrastructure.
A thaw could therefore have practical value without becoming a strategic partnership. More stable ties could support business confidence, access to capital goods and cooperation in areas where supply chains already cross borders. At the same time, military deployments along the border remain substantial, territorial disputes persist and Indian concerns about Chinese strategic behaviour have not disappeared. The trade deficit creates an additional tension: India may seek Chinese investment and capital goods while also trying to reduce excessive dependence.
Russia has a different interest in making BRICS more functional. Western sanctions have increased Moscow’s dependence on non-Western markets, payment arrangements and diplomatic partners. India and Russia agreed on September 11 to pursue stronger economic, defence and energy cooperation and reiterated a target of raising bilateral trade from nearly $70 billion to $100 billion by 2030. Russian President Vladimir Putin has argued for more practical cooperation in technology, infrastructure, investment and payments.
China’s objective is broader. Beijing wants greater influence in institutions where Western powers still set many of the rules and wants to reduce vulnerabilities created by dependence on dollar-based finance and Western-controlled technology and markets. The result is an overlap of interests rather than a common programme. Russia seeks alternatives under pressure, China seeks a stronger non-Western centre of gravity, and India seeks room to work with multiple power centres at once.
That divergence limits what BRICS can deliver as a collective infrastructure platform. Gulf members have their own relationships with the United States and China. Brazil has traditionally resisted turning BRICS into an explicitly anti-Western organisation. Indonesia also has reasons to deepen relations with several major economies simultaneously. The group can support cooperation in selected areas, but the evidence does not establish a unified investment or development strategy.
For urban infrastructure, the most relevant question is therefore not whether a leaders’ photograph can alter the international order. It is whether BRICS can create dependable institutions behind the photograph. That would require payment links that function across national systems, a development bank able to scale lending and mobilise private capital, and enough political agreement to keep projects insulated from disputes among member states.
The evidence shows a grouping with considerable demographic and economic weight, one established development bank and an expanding discussion around national currencies and payment interoperability. It also shows unresolved contradictions: members disagree over borders, wars, trade, security and the future relationship with Western institutions. The failure to issue a foreign ministers’ communiqué in May 2026 demonstrated how quickly those disagreements can become operational.
BRICS is therefore better understood as a platform for creating alternatives than as a finished alternative system. Its infrastructure-finance potential is real but limited by institutional capacity, political divergence and technical barriers. The developments worth monitoring are practical ones: whether the New Development Bank increases local-currency lending, whether payment systems become interoperable, whether India-China economic channels stabilise and whether the expanded membership can agree on projects rather than only principles.
