Lucknow Metro CAG Report Highlights Structural Risks
Lucknow — A recent Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) audit of the Lucknow Metro Rail Corporation (LMRC) has raised significant concerns about construction quality, safety compliance and financial governance in one of the city’s flagship transport projects.
The findings — tabled in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly this week — underscore persistent challenges in infrastructure execution and regulatory oversight in rapidly expanding urban transit systems. The audit covers Phase 1 of the metro project, which was planned between Ameauci and Munshipulia over a 22.88-kilometre corridor with 22 stations. Instead of building all stations envisaged in the detailed project report (DPR), the corporation excluded the Mahanagar station — originally projected to be among the busiest — without formal approvals from state or national authorities, violating binding agreements embedded in the DPR, financing documents and project MoUs.
Quality tests conducted by Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Kanpur, at the request of CAG auditors, identified notable discrepancies in rail material hardness. Hardness measurements on depot and main-line rails fell below Indian Railways standards designed to ensure durability and reduce wear-and-tear, raising longer-term maintenance and rider-safety concerns. Safety issues extended beyond materials. Noise levels measured inside coaches and on sections of the route exceeded internationally accepted thresholds, with some readings in the 83-decibel range — above the 75-decibel norm — potentially affecting commuter comfort and long-term health outcomes. Additionally, the corporation failed to renew an interim speed certificate, a mandatory safety clearance that governs permissible operating speeds and wheel-rail interaction over time.
Governance lapses were also prominent. The CAG found failures to secure required no objection certificates (NOCs) for groundwater extraction used in station water supply, lapses in performance guarantee collection from contractors, and advance payments for machinery that the corporation already possessed — all contrary to standard contracting norms. Irregular payments worth crores were documented, and key excavation permits were not obtained. The audit also questioned procurement and contracting practices. Security contracts for stations, depots and offices were awarded without open competitive bidding, and significant sums were paid to private firms under direct nominations. Financial irregularities included cost escalations where work estimated at tens of crores ended up costing significantly more without transparent justification.
Urban planners say such audit outcomes have serious implications for public infrastructure governance. Rapid urban transit projects, often funded by public capital and debt, depend on robust compliance systems to ensure safety, fiscal responsibility and equitable outcomes. Shortcomings in quality control or approval processes can erode public trust and reduce the utility of transport systems designed to reduce congestion, lower emissions and support urban productivity. Critically, the CAG’s findings resonate with broader discussions on infrastructure performance. In emerging megacities, the pressure to complete projects quickly — driven by political and economic incentives — can sometimes outpace the establishment of rigorous oversight regimes that are standard in more mature governance environments. Ensuring that safety certifications, material standards and contractual safeguards are respected or embedded from project inception is viewed by analysts as fundamental to building resilient urban transport systems.
The report has triggered official responses and calls for corrective action from state policymakers and urban managers. What remains to be seen is how these governance concerns will be translated into operative reforms, enhanced audit follow-through and systemic improvements that strengthen future transit infrastructure execution across northern India.
